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This paper analyses preference evolution in a bargaining situation. We show
that preferences for reciprocity, that sustain a conﬂict-free outcome, are viable
if players have enough information about opponents’ preferences. However, de-
pending on the initial starting point, preference evolution can in general both
enhance or reduce subjective and material welfare, relative to the situation where
all players have the usual materialistic preferences.
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11 Introduction
In most economic models people maximise their personal material gains. While hav-
ing served the economics profession well in many contexts, the assumption of such
”materialistic” preferences is not always supported by experiments. There subjects
often seem to be guided by concerns for ”fairness” or ”justice” and willing to punish
opponents who violate such norms, even though they will never meet the opponent
again and punishing means forgoing material gains.1
In this paper we allow for non-materialistic preferences and, using an evolutionary
approach, we analyse what preferences are most likely to win the ”struggle for sur-
vival”. In particular, we wish to see whether the preferences that evolve are ”good”
for the players, both in material and subjective terms. We do this in the context of a
simple bargaining situation, where two players are in dispute over a valuable resource
and must simultaneously choose between being ”moderate” or ”aggressive”. If both
players are aggressive, there is a costly conﬂict, while mutual moderation avoids it.
The players play the bargaining game only once. Thus we deliberately ignore the
well-known repeated game eﬀects that can bring about outcomes that are superior
to those of the one-shot game (see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)). Instead we are
interested in whether preference evolution on its own can improve the situation for
the players in the one-shot game.
To study the evolution of preferences, we employ the so-called indirect evolutionary
approach: Players act rationally given their preferences, but over time their preferences
can change. The basic idea is that if it pays better in material terms to be, say,
”selﬁsh” than ”cooperative”, people gradually adopt the former and abandon the
latter preference.2 As pointed out by G¨ uth (1995), the indirect evolutionary approach
can be interpreted as a generalisation of the standard models, where preferences are
exogenous.
A player with materialistic preferences maximises her material payoﬀs. However,
two materialistic players end up in conﬂict some of the time. Were both players dovish,
each would be strictly better oﬀ, both subjectively and materially. A player with
reciprocal preferences prefers to be moderate (aggressive) if the opponent is moderate
(aggressive). That is, she is kind to those who is kind to her and unkind to those
who is unkind to her. This is the behaviour that is often observed in experimental
settings and, indeed, in everyday life. One key implication of reciprocity is that when
two reciprocal players meet, and it is common knowledge that both are reciprocal,
mutual moderation can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium.3 As a consequence, two
reciprocal players perform better in material terms than two Materialists.
However, there are also two other feasible preference types: Altruistic players, who
strictly prefer to be moderate and Bullies, who strictly prefer to be aggressive. These
1See Section 5 below, where we review the literature.
2Huck (1997) provides a good survey of the basic ideas and methodological issues. A more formal
treatment is K¨ onigstein and M¨ uller (2000). The indirect approach diﬀers from the ”direct” evolu-
tionary approach, where players are ”programmed” to a certain behaviour and where preferences are
consequently immaterial. See e.g. Weibull (1995) for an exposition of the direct approach.
3There is also an equilibrium where both players are aggressive, but we will assume (as do other
papers in the literature) that they co-ordinate on the payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium.
2types should not be a priori excluded from the model. In fact, we show below that
it makes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for preference evolution whether they are available or
not. It is by allowing for these preference types that the paper is diﬀerent from other
contributions studying preference evolution in the literature (there are a number of
other diﬀerences; see Section 5 below, where we review the literature).
It is important how much information a player has about her opponent’s prefer-
ences. We follow G¨ uth (1995) in assuming that a player learns the opponent’s prefer-
ences with a certain exogenous probability and otherwise observes only the aggregate
distribution of players over the preference types. The higher this probability, the easier
it is to ”read” the opponent’s intentions. It is also important to remark that players
are restricted to ”truth-telling”, i.e., a player cannot pretend to have other preferences
than her true ones.
For expositional reasons, we ﬁrst assume that players are either Reciprocators or
Materialists. A reciprocal player performs well in a population of similarly minded
players, since conﬂict is avoided. Moreover, if players have enough information about
opponents’ preferences, a mutant with materialistic preferences performs badly, since
she invariably ends up in some conﬂict with the Reciprocators. Then reciprocity is
a stable outcome. If, on the other hand, players have very little or no information,
a reciprocal player is unable to distinguish between an opponent with the same pref-
erences and a materialistic one. Then reciprocity cannot be sustained and there is
always some conﬂict.
We then assume that a player can also be of the Altruist or Bully type. Reciprocity
is now less stable than before and the reason is, ironically enough, the presence of the
altruistic players. Moreover, if there initially are many Materialists and/or Bullies in
the population, the Reciprocators die out. This happens because they get involved
in too much costly conﬂict with their opponents, while the materialistic players avoid
this. The population then ends up in a mixture of materialistic players and Bully
players. The Bullies survive in this population because they are eﬀectively ”commit-
ted” to aggression and this gives them an advantage when meeting the Materialists.4
When players have little or no information about opponents’ preferences, the sur-
vival chances of materialistic players are improved, since the ”commitment” of Bullies
become useless when they cannot be properly recognised.
We then consider the players’ material welfare. When players can be either Mate-
rialists or Reciprocators, they are always materially better oﬀ under perfect informa-
tion in any stable outcome, relative to the benchmark where they are all Materialists.
However, when all four preference types are allowed, the material welfare eﬀects of
preference evolution become ambiguous: In the Bully-Materialist population mix, ma-
terial player welfare is lower than in the all-Materialist population, while players are
best oﬀ when everybody are Reciprocators. Thus the paper shows that preference
evolution can worsen the players’ material well-being, relative to the situation where
all players have materialistic preferences.
The implications of the model for the interpretation of observed experimental be-
haviour is quite simple: The subject population has Reciprocal and/or Altruistic pref-
4The insight that such a ”commitment” can confer an advantage on a player in bargaining and
other situations is due to Schelling (1960). See also Hirshleifer (1987).
3erences. Moreover, the model informs us that we have been lucky: Were the initial
conditions diﬀerent, we would have observed a much inferior performance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In
Section 3, we analyse the case where players are either Materialists or Reciprocators.
Then in Section 4 we allow for all feasible preference types. Section 5 relates the results
to the existing literature. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Section 7 is the Appendix,
which contains all proofs.
2 The Model
Consider two players who must divide a valuable surplus between them and who
simultaneously choose between being ”Hawkish” (H) and ”Dovish” (D). The material




Figure 1: The material payoﬀs in the bargaining game.
If the opponent is dovish, it pays a player to be hawkish, since that gives more than
half of the surplus (a very good deal) and being dovish only gives one-half ( a fair deal).
However, if the opponent is hawkish, dovishness is better, since a poor deal is better
than no deal. Two hawkish players waste the surplus completely, so they each perform
strictly worse than two dovish players.5 The game is a variant of the Hawk-Dove (or
”Chicken”) game, which has been used to study behaviour in a variety of economic,
political, military and even biological contexts. See, for example, Hirshleifer (1982),
Kahn (1965), Lipman (1986), Maynard-Smith (1982). Here we restrict ourselves to a
bargaining interpretation.
In a 2 × 2 game a player can have 24 (= 4!) diﬀerent strict preference orderings
over outcomes. However, in terms of the best replies the ordering induces, many of
them are equivalent. Let (i,j)  (m,n), with i,j,m,n = D,H, indicate that a player
strictly prefers the outcome where she plays i and the opponent plays j to the outcome
where she plays m and the opponent plays n. We consider the following four strict
orderings:
Deﬁnition 1 :
A player with material preferences (a Materialist) has the ranking
(H,D)  (D,D)  (D,H)  (H,H).
5The results below hold for other material payoﬀ numbers, as long as (i). playing H gives strictly
more than one-half, but not all, of the surplus when the opponent plays D, (ii). H is strictly better
than D when the opponent plays D and (iii). a mutual choice of D gives each player a strictly higher
material payoﬀ than when both players choose H.
4A player with reciprocal preferences (a Reciprocator) has the ranking
(D,D)  (H,D)  (H,H)  (D,H).
A player with altruistic preferences (an Altruist) has the ranking
(D,D)  (H,D)  (D,H)  (H,H).
A player with bully preferences (a Bully) has the ranking
(H,D)  (D,D)  (H,H)  (D,H).
A Materialist maximises the material payoﬀs, i.e., she is the type normally assumed
in economics. A Reciprocator maximises ”fairness” or ”justice”: A dovish opponent is
rewarded, since the Reciprocator is also dovish; and a hawkish opponent is punished,
since the Reciprocator is hawkish, too. We may say that a person with reciprocal pref-
erences adheres to a social norm of not exploiting dovish opponents and of punishing
hawkish opponents. An Altruist strictly prefers to ”help” the opponent, by raising the
latter’s material payoﬀ, no matter what the opponent intends to do. Finally, a Bully
may be said to be spiteful or even malicious, since she acts to lower the opponent’s
material payoﬀ, no matter what the latter does.6
For convenience, we will say that a player’s preferences gives her type. Consider
now a large population of players, where a player is of one of the four types above.
Let sM, sR, sA and sB denote the population shares of Materialists, Reciprocators,
Altruists and Bullies, respectively. Then s = (sM,sR,sA,sB), with
P
i si = 1 and
si ≥ 0 for i = M,R,A,B, is the population state. At each point in time, players
are randomly matched in pairs and then play a Nash equilibrium of the game with
subjective payoﬀs. Let V (i,j) denote the resulting material payoﬀ to a player of type i
when she is matched with a player of type j, where i,j = M,R,A,B (we derive these
payoﬀs below). Also, let V (i,s) denote the expected material payoﬀ to a player of
type i, when the population state is s. Finally, V (s,s) =
P
i siV (i,s) is the material
average payoﬀ in the population state s.
We assume that the share of players of type i grows if and only if those players earn
an expected material payoﬀ that is higher than the average material payoﬀ. Formally,
the evolution of the population shares is governed by the Replicator Dynamic (Taylor
and Jonker (1978)):
˙ si = si[V (i,s) − V (s,s)],
where i = M,R,A,B. Note that only the material performance matters for the growth
of players of a given preference. However, preferences matter indirectly, since they
(together with the entire population’s preference conﬁguration) determine a player’s
material performance.
However, rather than studying the Replicator Dynamic itself, we shall limit our-
selves to studying the end-points of the dynamic process. That is, we wish to ﬁnd
those population states that are stationary and (asymptotically) stable for the Repli-
6The results would not change if we interchanged (H,H) with (H,D) in the Reciprocator’s ranking.
The same is true if we interchange (H,D) and (D,H) in the Altruists’s ranking and, ﬁnally, if we
interchange (H,H) and (D,D) in the Bully’s ranking. This is because the players’ best reply structures
remain unchanged.
5cator Dynamic. To do this, we use the following concepts from the evolutionary game
theory literature:
Deﬁnition 2 (Maynard-Smith (1973,1982)):
A population state s is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) if (i). V (s0,s) ≤
V (s,s) for all s0 and (ii). If V (s0,s) = V (s,s), then V (s,s0) > V (s0,s0).
A population state s is a Neutrally Stable Strategy (NSS) if (i). V (s0,s) ≤ V (s,s)
for all s0 and (ii). If V (s0,s) = V (s,s), then V (s,s0) ≥ V (s0,s0).
The deﬁnition says that for a population state to be an ESS, it must, ﬁrst, be
a Nash equilibrium (part (i)). The interpretation is that if mutants, with behaviour
corresponding to s0, enter the population, they must not perform better than the
incumbents, whose behaviour corresponds to s. This ensures that the mutants cannot
spread in the population. Second, if the mutants perform exactly as well as the
incumbents, the incumbent players outperform the mutants against similar mutants
(part (ii)). The two conditions ensure that the mutants disappears again. The NSS
deﬁnition diﬀers only in the slightly weaker second condition: The mutants may not
be driven out, but will not spread. Clearly, an ESS is an NSS, while the converse may
or may not be true.
The ESS and NSS concepts are very useful to check the stability properties of a
population state: If a population state s is an ESS, then s is (locally) asymptotically
stable for the Replicator Dynamic (Taylor and Jonker (1978)). If s is an NSS, then s is
Lyapunov stable for the Replicator Dynamic (Thomas (1985) and Bomze and Weibull
(1995)). In other words, if a population state s is an ESS, we converge to s when close
enough and, once there, we stay there. If s is an NSS, no exogenous shock can lead
away from s. However, unlike asymptotic stability, there may be no ”pull” towards
the population state. The reader may consult e.g. Weibull (1995) for details.
3 Materialists and Reciprocators
We start by assuming that a player is either a Materialist or a Reciprocator. We also
initially assume that players are perfectly informed about opponents’ preferences.
When two Materialists meet, the game with subjective payoﬀs has three Nash
equilibria: Two asymmetric pure equilibria, (D,H) and (H,D), and a mixed Nash
equilibrium. We assume that players cannot condition their choice on the player
position (and have no correlation devices). Thus two Materialists play the mixed
Nash equilibrium.7 Since this equilibrium involves some conﬂict, the material payoﬀ
to each player is strictly below one-half (the expected material payoﬀ to each player is
a convex combination of the material payoﬀs 1/2 and 1/4.) Moreover, the outcome is
ineﬃcient: Each player would be subjectively strictly better oﬀ had they each played
D.
7We will assume that the mixing probabilities in this equilibrium are the same as those of the
mixed equilibrium of the material payoﬀs game in Figure 1 above. It follows that each Materialist
plays Dove with probability 1/2.
6Consider next a meeting between a Reciprocator and a Materialist. In this case
there is a unique and mixed Nash equilibrium, with each player receiving a material
payoﬀ strictly below one-half. Again this outcome is ineﬃcient, since each player
would be subjectively strictly better oﬀ under mutual dovishness.
Suppose ﬁnally two Reciprocators meet. There are then two strict Nash equilibria,
(D,D) and (H,H). There is also a mixed Nash equilibrium, but we ignore it here
and focus on the strict equilibria. In the (D,D) equilibrium, both the material and
the subjective payoﬀ to each player is strictly higher than in the (H,H) equilibrium.
Moreover, the former equilbirium is eﬃcient, while the latter is not. We make the
following assumption:
Assumption 1 When two Reciprocators meet, they co-ordinate on the (D,D) Nash
equilibrium.
We will comment below on how important this assumption of perfect coordination
is.8
We then obtain the following material payoﬀ matrix for the evolutionary game.
M R
M V (M,M) V (M,R)
R V (R,M) 1/2
Figure 2: The evolutionary game with Materialists (M) and Reciprocators (R).
From this matrix we get the following result:
Proposition 1 Suppose players have perfect information about opponents’ prefer-
ences. Then the population consisting of only Reciprocators is an ESS. The all-
Materialist population is an ESS if and only if V (R,M) < V (M,M).
Proposition 1 is good news for reciprocity: If all players have reciprocal preferences,
no mutant can displace the population. And if the initial population state is close, we
end up in the all-reciprocal population.9 However, materialism can also be an ESS, if
a Materialist performs strictly better than a Reciprocator against another Materialist.
Intuitively, this can happen because a Reciprocator, when she meets a Materialist and
there is the resulting conﬂict, lowers not only the Materialist’s material payoﬀ, but
also her own material payoﬀ. And she may lower her material payoﬀ so much that she
performs worse against a Materialist than another Materialist.
Assume now that a player knows only the overall distribution of player types, i.e.,
the population state, s. This is her prior belief about any opponent’s type. Then,
with some exogenous probability, she sobserves the opponent’s type, which is then
her posterior belief. With complementary probability, she observes nothing and her
8A similar assumption is made in other papers, e.g. Guttman (2000).
9Note that the Reciprocator strategy will remain an ESS even if two Reciprocators sometimes do
not manage to co-ordinate on (D,D), as long as this does not happen too often.
7posterior equals her prior belief. This is the set-up developed in G¨ uth (1995) and we
use it to model a situation where there is always some chance that a player learns
something correct about her opponent.
When two players are matched, there are four possible information situations: Both
players observe the opponent’s preference (this was analysed in the previous section);
only one of the players observe the opponent’s preference (and vice versa); and, ﬁnally,
neither player observes the opponent’s preferences. We assume that Nature decides
between these four possibilities with probabilites α, β, γ and 1−(α+β+γ), respectively.
In this symmetric context, Nature cannot condition her choice on players’ identities;
we therefore have β = γ. We also assume that Nature’s choice is revealed to the
players before they choose their strategies. Thus it is common knowledge what the
information situation is.
Consider ﬁrst the population state consisting of only reciprocating players. Each
Reciprocator earns expected material payoﬀ equal to one-half. Can a mutant with
materialistic preferences invade this population? With probability α, the mutant is
recognised and gets the material payoﬀ V (M,R), as before. With probability β, the
Reciprocator learns that she faces a Materialist, while the Materialist observes only the
aggregate distribution of preference types. This again gives material payoﬀ V (M,R)
to the mutant. If the Reciprocator does not observe the type of the materialistic
mutant, but the mutant learns she faces a Reciprocator, the Reciprocator plays D
and the mutant plays H. This is clearly the most favourable situation for the mutant.
If neither player observes the oponent’s type, one gets the same outcome. Thus, at
the all-Reciprocator population state, the expected material payoﬀ to a materialistic
mutant is V (M,s) = (α + β)V (M,R) + (1 − α − β)(3/4). It follows that when
V (M,s) < 1/2, the Reciprocator population is an ESS.
Using a similar argument for the all-Materialist population gives the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose players have imperfect information about opponents’ prefer-
ences, but still have some information: α + β > 0. Then
(a). The all-Reciprocator population is an ESS when α + β >
1/4
3/4−V (M,R) .
(b). The all-Materialist population is an ESS if V (R,M) < V (M,M).
This proposition generalises Proposition 1 to the case of imperfect type informa-
tion: The all-reciprocating population remains an ESS as long as it is suﬃciently likely
that a hostile mutant is recognised, such that the resulting conﬂict lowers the mutant’s
material expected payoﬀ enough to prevent it from invading. Similarly, the Materi-
alist population remains an ESS under imperfect information only if a Materialist
outperforms a Reciprocator against other Materialists.
Finally, we consider the case where a player receives no speciﬁc information about
her opponent’s preferences at all:
Proposition 3 Suppose players have no speciﬁc information about their opponents’
preferences, i.e., α = β = 0. Then the Reciprocator population is unstable and the
all-Materialist population is an NSS (and may be an ESS).
8The all-Reciprocator population is unstable because the Reciprocators are dovish
against all opponents, also against a materialistic mutant, who exploits this by playing
H. Such a mutant performs better than the incumbents and invades.
94 Allowing for all four preference types
The previous analysis was restrictive in that the Altruist and the Bully preference
type were not available. Making these types feasible gives the following 4 × 4 matrix:
M R A B
M V (M,M) V (M,R) 3/4 1/4
R V (R,M) 1/2 1/2 0
A 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/4
B 3/4 0 3/4 0
Figure 3: Material payoﬀs in the evolutionary game. M: Materialist, R: Recipro-
cator, A: Altruist, B: Bully.
Note that neither the Bully or the Altruist strategy is dominated. In particular,
facing a Materialist, the Bully strategy performs better in material terms than any
other strategy.
A study of this matrix yields the following proposition, which is proven in the
Appendix.
Proposition 4 Suppose players have perfect information. Then
(a). The population of only Reciprocators is an NSS. The same is true for any popu-
lation state with only Reciprocators and Altruists, as long as the population share of Al-
truists, sA, is suﬃciently small. Precisely, the condition is sA < [1/2−V (M,R)]/[3/4−
V (M,R)].
(b). The population state s∗ consisting of only Materialists and Bullies and where
the share of Bullies is s∗
B = [3/4 − V (M,M)]/[1 − V (M,M)] is an ESS.
The bad news is now part (b): There is an ESS where no Reciprocators are present
at all, but only Bullies and Materialists.10 Even though there is conﬂict whenever two
Bullies or two Reciprocators meet, preferences are optimally adapted: In an encounter
with a Bully, a best material reply is to be dovish, which is what the Materialist prefers.
Conversely, a best reply when meeting a Materialist is to be hawkish, which is what
the Bully-type prefers. Moreover, no reciprocal (or altruistic) mutant can invade the
population: Relative to a materialistic player a reciprocal mutant ends up in total
conﬂict with a Bully and is not compensated enough by meeting the Materialists. In
other words, preference evolution has gone into a ”trap”, where conﬂict persists.
Note that the Bully players survive in the ESS because each is, by virtue of her
strict H-preference, ”committed” to gettting the lion’s share of the surplus. A Ma-
terialist is therefore dovish when meeting a Bully and consequently a population of
Materialists is invaded by a Bully mutant. This implies that the all-Materialist pop-
ulation is now unstable.11
10This is true, irrespective of whether V (R,M) > V (M,M) or not, which was important in
Propoposition 1 above.
11Similar results has been established in the evolutionary game theory literature (See Banerjee and
10There is still some good news (part (a)), but it is less good than before: Recip-
rocal behaviour can still survive, but its survival ability is lower than in the previous
section, where a Reciprocator performed strictly better than any other player type
in a population of reciprocal players. Now the new Altruistic type performs exactly
as well: When an Altruist meets a Reciprocator, the outcome is (D,D), just as when
two Reciprocators meet. Moreover, the two types perform exactly as well against
another Altruist, so in any mix of Reciprocators and Altruists each type is equally
well oﬀ. This is why the all-reciprocal population is an NSS, but no longer an ESS.12
However, an altruistic player is easy prey for a Materialist, so the population mix is
stable only as long as there are suﬃciently few Altruists. Any small perturbation of
the population that would violate the inequality in the proposition above would allow
Materialists to enter the population and the population will be taken away from the
Reciprocator-Altruist population.
Another way to see that it is not the Bullies who threaten reciprocity, but altruism,
is to assume that the altruistic type is not feasible. Then the Reciprocator strategy
would be an ESS again (since it would be a strict Nash equilibrium of the reduced
3 × 3 game).13 The important thing is that reciprocal behaviour would be immune
to any mutant only if they also inﬂicted some loss on the Altruists. However, in this
model, where players act rationally given their preferences, the optimal policy for a
Reciprocator is, intuitively speaking, to ”forgive” the Altruist and not ”punish” her
for her unwilingness to punish other people. Thus, preference evolution cannot solve
the problem of ”who punishes the non-punishers”.
Let us now consider the players’ material welfare under perfect information. If
only the Materialistic and the Reciprocal type are available, as in the previous section,
then material payoﬀs in any stable outcome is always at least as high as when only the
Materialist type was available. In this sense preference evolution improves the material
well-being of the players by ”injecting” into the population a preference for reciprocity
that allows players to sustain behaviour with higher material payoﬀs. Suppose then
all four preference types are feasible. Then players are materially best oﬀ in the
Reciprocator-Altruist NSS. Moreover, they are materially strictly better oﬀ in the
all-Materialist population than in the Bully-Materialist ESS (the reader is referred to
the Appendix for a proof). In other words, allowing players to have other preference
orderings than the materialistic one can increase the players’ material welfare or reduce
it.14
Weibull (1994) and Sethi (1996)), but those papers use the direct evolutionary approach, i.e., the
Bullies are directly ”programmed” to ”irrational” behaviour. Here, in contrast, the Bullies are fully
rational, but have preferences that, at ﬁrst sight, seem irrational.
12Note also that, unlike the previous section, reciprocal behaviour is no longer robust to small
perturbations of their ability to co-ordinate on the (D,D) equilibrium: If reciprocal players sometimes
mis-coordinated, they would perform strictly worse than the Altruists in any Reciprocator-Altruist
mix.
13A similar phenomenon has been observed in evolutionary models of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
There the ”Tit-For-Tat” strategy (TFT), who co-operates conditionally (see Axelrod (1984)) and
the strategy that co-operates unconditionally perform equally well in a population mix of the two
strategies. The TFT-strategy is an ESS only when the latter strategy is excluded. See, for example,
the survey in Sethi (2001).
14Banerjee and Weibull (1994) show the same in a framework where ”optimising” players interact
with ”programmed” players. Sethi (1996) reaches similar results in his direct evolutionary analysis
of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment.
11Finally, as regards imperfect type information, results similar to Propositions 2
and 3 hold for the four-strategy case. In particular, when players have no information
about opponents’ preferences at all, the all-Materialist population is an NSS, i.e.,
stable. The reason is that since a Bully is no longer recognised by a Materialist,
the Bully cannot ”convince” the Materialist that the latter should be dovish. Thus
the Bully no longer performs better than a Materialist and there is no ESS as under
perfect information. The all-Reciprocator population is unstable for the same reasons
that were given in the previous section. Instead the only stable population is the one
consisting of only Materialists.15
5 Related literature
Some good surveys of the importance of reciprocity are Fehr and G¨ achter (1998), Fehr
and Tyran (1997) and Sethi and Somanathan (2001). The latter also surveys the
literature using the direct evolutionary approach. Many economists have interpreted
reciprocity as means to overcome ineﬃciences caused by opportunism, asymmetric
information and incomplete contracts. See, for example, Arrow (1971), Ben-Ner and
Putterman (2000), Bowles (1998), Fehr and G¨ achter (1998), G¨ uth and Kliemt (1994),
Hirshleifer (1987) and Sugden (1986).
There is much experimental evidence on the role of reciprocity. In the Ultimatum
game, Responder subjects reject low oﬀers (i.e., bad behaviour is punished) and ac-
cept suﬃciently high oﬀers (good behaviour is rewarded). See G¨ uth et. al. (1982) and
Roth (1995). In the Dictator Game, players donate signiﬁcant amounts. See Forsythe,
Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994). Another context where reciprocity seems impor-
tant is in public goods experiments, where players often reach contribution levels that
are substantally higher than those predicted by the theoretical model based on mate-
rialistic preferences. See, for example, Fehr and G¨ achter (1998) and Hoﬀman, McCabe
and Smith (1998). The many Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments show that players coop-
erate, even in one-shot simultaneous move games, where players know they will never
meet each other again. See, for example, Cooper et. al. (1996). In the context of
the labor market and the employer-employee relationship, several papers have docu-
mented the role of reciprocity. See Agell and Lundborg (1995), Fehr, Kirchsteiger and
Riedl (1993), Fehr and G¨ achter (1998)), Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Kirchler, Fehr
and Evans (1996).
There are several contributions in the literature that study theoretically what
behaviour preference evolution can sustain. In the following I highlight some of the
diﬀerences and similarities between these models and the one studied here.
Possajennikov (2000) considers preference evolution in general symmetric 2 × 2
games, including the Hawk-Dove game, which our material stage game is an instance
of. Like us, he assumes that two Reciprocators (he calls them ”conformists”) coordi-
nate on the equilibrium with the highest material payoﬀ. Similarly, two Materialists
15Since the Materialists play a mixed Nash equilibrium where the material payoﬀs from being
dove and hawk are exactly balanced, any other mutant perform exactly as well as a Materialist.
Hence the mutant can enter, but not displace, the all-Materialist population. This implies that the
all-Materialist population is stable. A similar result is derived in Banerjee and Weibull (1994).
12(or, in his terminology, ”non-conformists”), play the mixed Nash equilibrium. The
key diﬀerence between his approach and ours is that he also allows for the preference
type who is indiﬀerent between outcomes. This type is quite successful in his model,
since it can be led to choose the optimal action in each encounter with other types.
However, we ﬁnd it rather diﬃcult to interpret such a preference in the context of
the paper. Consequently, we restrict attention to strict preference orderings. Another
diﬀerence is that Possajennikov only studies the evolutionary stability of population
states where all players use the same strategy (’monomorphic’ population states).
G¨ uth and Yaari (1992) study a game where players have an opportunity to punish
an opponent’s ”unfair” behaviour, after a surplus has been divided. Assuming perfect
type information, a preference for such punishment will evolve. This happens because a
player who is willing to punish is treated fairly and, moreover, she exploits an opponent
who is not himself willing to punish. One diﬀerence between their model and the
present is that their punishers beneﬁt when ”punishing” an unfair opponent. This, in
turn, implies that the state with materialists is unstable in their model. In this model,
on the other hand, a Reciprocator can, when she meets a Materialist, lower her own
material payoﬀ so much that she performs worse than the materialist against another
materialist. Then the all-Materialist population state is stable. Another diﬀerence
is that their Reciprocators are ”meaner” than ours: The former prefer to exploit an
opponent who is fair but unwilling to punish, rather than being fair themselves (and
to not punish). This happens because preferences in their model are speciﬁed such
that a player cannot decide to ”forgive” a player who is fair but unwilling to punish.
Thus the problem of ”who punishes the non-punishers” does not arise in their model,
unlike the present, where altruism destabilised reciprocity. G¨ uth (1995) generalises
the analysis of G¨ uth and Yaari (1992) to the case of imperfect type information. In
this paper we followed his modelling approach.
G¨ uth and Kliemt (1994) analyse a ”game of trust”, where a ﬁrst-mover can either
”stay out” or trust a second-mover and the second-mover can either reciprocate or
exploit the ﬁrst-mover’s trust. When all players have materialistic preferences, the
second-mover will exploit the ﬁrst-mover’s trust and the outcome is ineﬃcient. They
show that when second-movers can evolve a preference for reciprocation and if the
ﬁrst-mover can distinguish between trust-worthy and untrustworthy second-movers, an
eﬃcient outcome can evolve. They also show that when there is no speciﬁc information,
but ﬁrst-movers can, at a cost, learn the second-mover’s type, both exploiting and
reciprocal types may co-exist.
Fershtman and Weiss (1998), Guttman (2000) and Ockenfels (1993) analyse evo-
lution of preferences in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. These papers assume more
speciﬁc forms of preferences than the present paper. In Guttman (2000), for example,
two preference types are feasible (roughly corresponding to our Reciprocators and Ma-
terialists). The conclusions of this and the other papers would be somewhat diﬀerent
if all the four types analysed in this paper were feasible. The reader is referred to
Poulsen (2001b).
Other papers using the indirect approach are Bester and G¨ uth (1998), who show
that altruism can be evolutionarily stable; Bowles and Gintis (1998), who study a
situation where players may develop a preference for punishing free riders; Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) emphasise the role of inequity aversion as explaining many observed
13empirical regularities; Huck (1997, 1998) study the interplay between preferences and
the design of legal institutions; Huck and Oechssler (1999) study fairness preferences
in the Ultimatum Game; K¨ onigstein (1998) show that eﬃciency can evolve in a set-up
with bargaining and production; Poulsen (2001a) show that Responders can, under
certain circumstances, develop preferences that allow them to rationally refuse low
oﬀers. Finally, papers who analyse preference evolution in other set-ups are Ely and
Yilankaya (1997), Kockesen, Ok and Sethi (2000a,b), Ok and Vega-Redondo (2000)
and Sethi and Somanathan (2000).
6 Conclusion
Experimental research has shown that reciprocity is an important determinant of many
kinds of behaviour in many economic and social situations. This has raised some
doubt about the validity of the assumption that players always have the materialistic
preferences that are typically assumed in economics. In this paper we constructed
a simple model where players were allowed to have diﬀerent kinds of preferences.
By allowing the various preference types to ”compete for survival”, we avoided the
methodological pitfall of simply assuming that players are always ”nice”.
Two players with reciprocal preferences share the surplus without any conﬂict and
perform strictly better than two Materialists. We showed that reciprocity is stable
whenever Reciprocators inﬂict a loss on players of other types.
This result was quite optimistic: Preference evolution would improve players’ ma-
terial welfare through the evolution of reciprocity. However, preference evolution need
not ”inject” only reciprocity into an all-materialistic population. It may also develop a
taste for blind aggression (the Bully type) or for pure altruism (Altruism). We there-
fore made these preferences available to the players, in addition to the materialistic
and reciprocal types. Our results then became less optimistic. First, the Altruists
tended to destabilise reciprocity, because the Reciprocators treated the Altruists as
they treated other Reciprocators. Moreover, very aggressive players and Materialists
could end up co-existing and no reciprocal player could invade such a population.
Preference evolution could therefore improve or worsen the situation for the players,
relative to the situation where all players were Materialists. What matters here is the
initial starting point of the dynamic process of preference change.
An important insight of the paper is therefore that preference evolution need not
always lead to materially better outcomes for the players. It is possible that it leads
into a ”trap”, where preferences are optimally co-adapted, but where the outcome for
players is both subjectively and materially worse than when all players have materi-
alistc preferences.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Since V (M,R) < V (R,R) = 1/2, the R-strategy is a strict
Nash equilibrium and so an ESS (see e.g. Weibull (1995)). If V (R,M) < V (M,M), the
14M-strategy is an ESS for the same reason. If, on the other hand, V (R,M) > V (M,M),
the M-strategy is not even a Nash equilibrium. If V (R,M) = V (M,M), the M-
strategy again fails to be an ESS (and an NSS), since V (M,R) < V (R,R).
Proof of Proposition 2: A proof is available from the author upon request.
Proof of Proposition 3: A proof is available from the author upon request.
Proof of Proposition 4: (a). Let s be any population state with carrier in {R, A}.
Then V (s,s) = 1/2 and V (s0,s) ≤ V (s,s) for all s0 when sA ≤ [1/2−V (M,R)]/[3/4−
V (M,R)]. Then (s,s) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium and part (i) of the NSS deﬁ-
nition is satisﬁed. When the inequality holds strictly, one has V (s0,s) = V (s,s) only
for those s0 with carrier in {R,D}. Moreover, since for these s0 one has V (s,s0) =
V (s0,s0) = 1/2, s satisﬁes the second part of the NSS deﬁnition as well. (b). Let s be
a population state with carrier {M,H}. One computes that (s,s) is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium when the population share of Bullies satisﬁes s∗
H = [3/4−V (M,M)]/[1−
V (M,M)]. To verify the second part of the ESS deﬁnition, note that V (s0,s∗) =
V (s∗,s∗) only for those s0 with carrier in {M,B}. To verify that V (s∗,s0) > V (s0,s0)
for all such s0, one may compute V (s∗,s0)−V (s0,s0) = (s∗
H −s0
H)[V (H,s0)−V (M,s0)].






H)2[1 − V (M,M)]. This expression is strictly positive for all s0
H 6= s∗
H.
Thus s∗ is an ESS.
We ﬁnally prove the statement that we made in Section 4 about the material
payoﬀs in the various outcomes. In the Reciprocator-Altruist mix everybody earns
one-half. In the all-Materialist population the mixed Nash equilibrium of the material
payoﬀs game is played. This gives an expected material payoﬀ equal to V (M,M) =
3/8 < 1/2. Finally, in the Bully-Materialist ESS, each player earns expected material
payoﬀ (1 − s∗
H)(3/8) + s∗
H(1/4) < 3/8, since s∗
H > 0. This ranking of material payoﬀs
holds also for the more general material payoﬀ speciﬁcation outlined in Footnote 4
above.
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